




In this paper I study the relation between self-employment and the tax rates
on wages and on self-employment income. Using variation in the statutory tax
rates across countries, industries, and occupations, I find that while the share of
self-employed is strongly positively correlated with the tax rate on wage income,
it is weakly negatively correlated with the tax rate on self-employed income. The
asymmetry between the effects of the tax rates suggests that those who choose
self-employment partly do so in order to evade taxes. This extensive margin of
adjustment – between employment and self-employment – should be taken into
account when considering the effects of tax rates on labor income, on taxable in-
come and on welfare.
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1 Introduction
One of the central questions in tax policy is the response of tax evasion to tax rates.
On the one hand, the intensive response of evaded income to the (marginal) tax rate
is theoretically ambiguous, and while there is no consensus in the empirical litera-
ture, the most recent evidence suggest a small positive response.1 On the other hand,
there is overwhelming evidence that mostly the self-employed income – which is not
subject to third party reporting – is evaded.2 This implies that there is a potential ex-
tensive response of tax evasion to tax rates, coming from a change in the fraction of
self-employed workers.
In this paper I study the relation between the share of self-employed and the tax
rates on salaried and on self-employment income. My paper contributes to the lit-
erature in a number of ways. First, I document a novel pattern in self-employment
rates across occupations. Second, I create tax schedules for the employed and the self-
employed for each country in my sample, which allows me to analyze the effects of
taxes at a more micro level than previous studies. Finally, I explore the relation be-
tween self-employment and tax rates calculated at the industry–occupation–country
level. I find that while the share of self-employed in an industry–occupation is strongly
positively correlated with the salaried average tax rate, it is either weakly negatively
or not correlated with the self-employed average tax rate. The asymmetry between the
correlation with the employed and the self-employed tax rate suggests that those who
choose self-employment, partly do so to take advantage of the technology it offers in
evading taxes.
Using cross-country household level data from the Luxembourg Income Studies
(LIS) I document an important novel pattern of self-employment across countries.
I show that there are systematic differences across occupations in the propensity of
self-employment: for example among managers the average self-employment rate in
1In general there is both an income and a substitution effect of tax rates, which of the two dominates
depends on the assumed penalties and detection probabilities, see for example Allingham and Sandmo
(1972) and Yitzhaki (1974). Empirically while Clotfelter (1983) finds a positive, Feinstein (1991) finds a
negative effect of marginal tax rates on evasion, Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner, Pedersen, and Saez (2011)
find a positive effect. For surveys see Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) and Sandmo (2005).
2See for example Kleven et al. (2011) and Artavanis, Morse, and Tsoutsoura (2016), this literature is
discussed in further detail below.
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my sample is 37 percent, among clerical support workers this fraction is only 2 percent.
While it is known that the self-employment rate varies across different industries of
the economy,3 to my knowledge the systematic differences across occupations have re-
ceived little attention. However, even after controlling for these systematic differences
between occupations and industries there is a large variation in self-employment rates
across countries. These observations suggest that (i) a key determinant of the self-
employment decision is the individual’s occupation and industry, but that nonetheless
(ii) there are large cross-country differences in self-employment rates within indus-
tries and occupations. I argue that these differences, beyond country-level shifters, are
partly explained by the differences in tax schedules across countries.
I build detailed income tax schedules, including employee and self-employed so-
cial security schedules for each country in my sample. I show that the average tax rate
faced by employees and by self-employed vary substantially within countries both
across occupations and across industries. For example in Finland the average of the
average tax rate on salaried income is 31.8%, across occupations this varies between
26.3 and 41.8%, and across industries between 29.4 and 35.3%. This suggests that even
in a cross-country setting using a single tax rate to capture the effect of taxes is proba-
bly insufficient.
In a simple model I show the intuitive result that if only the self-employed can
evade income tax, then the employee and the self-employed tax rate have an asym-
metric effect on the propensity of self-employment. I test the predictions of the model
at the industry–occupation level using the LIS database combined with the income tax
and social security functions I built for nine countries in two years. Exploiting varia-
tion in the tax rate both within and across countries, industries and occupations, I find
that while the tax rate faced as an employee has a significant positive relation to the
self-employment rate, the tax rate faced as a self-employed has a much smaller, less
precisely estimated negative effect. These results provide supportive evidence of the
predictions of the model with tax evasion. The large difference between the magni-
3For example Acs, Audretsch, and Evans (1994), Blanchflower (2000), Parker and Robson (2004)
document the differences in self-employment rates between agriculture vs non-agriculture, manufac-
turing vs services, public vs private sectors, and Torrini (2005) documents that there are systematic
differences across finer industry categories as well.
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tude of the coefficient on the employee and the self-employed tax rate suggests that
when taxes on dependent employment income are high, more individuals choose self-
employment in order to take advantage of the technology it offers in evading taxes.
I build on the literature which has documented that it is mostly the self-employed
individuals who evade income taxes, and that they underreport their income by a sub-
stantial amount. This is because the income of the self-employed is not reported to the
tax authority by a third party, which drastically reduces the probability of detection.
The papers that document this fall into one of two categories. Papers in the first cat-
egory rely on data from tax audits, which provides direct measures of uncovered tax
evasion, or adjustments in income reporting in response to a threat of audit.4 Papers in
the second category build on the assumption that if employed and self-employed indi-
viduals are similar in their level of consumption or bank loans, but the self-employed
have lower declared earnings, then this is due to income underreporting.5 While these
papers use different methodologies, and data from different countries and different
time periods, they all find that the underreporting of income from self-employment is
between 20 and 50%, with most studies finding numbers closer to 50%.
These observations suggest that the tax rates, which determine both the net income
difference and the gains from income underreporting, should have an impact on the
choice of becoming self-employed. Most of the previous literature on the effects of
taxes on self-employment estimate reduced form equations, where they control for a
single tax rate faced by the employed – among other variables – and tend to find a
positive correlation.6
My estimation strategy is closer to that of Bruce (2000) and Parker (2003), in that
it relies on the gains from working as a self-employed rather than as an employee. I
4Andreoni et al. (1998), Bloomquist (2003), and Slemrod (2007) use the Taxpayer Compliance Mea-
surement Program of the US Internal Revenue Service, which is a thorough tax audit on a stratified
random sample of income tax returns. Kleven et al. (2011) use data from a tax enforcement field exper-
iment in Denmark.
5 Pissarides and Weber (1989), Baker (1993), Apel (1994), Schuetze (2002), Johansson (2005), Kim,
Gibson, and Chung (2009), Hurst, Li, and Pugsley (2014) for example use data on consumption and
income, while Artavanis et al. (2016) uses data on loans and income from a large Greek bank.
6See for example Long (1982), Blau (1987),Parker (1996), Robson and Wren (1999), Schuetze (2000),
Parker and Robson (2004). The additional variables typically used are country level variables such
as the minimum wage, social security coverage, unemployment rate and benefit, interest rate, total
factor productivity, share of manufacturing, private services and the public sector, or demographic
characteristics such as age, gender, education.
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explicitly take into account the possibility of evasion by the self-employed, and in line
with the model’s predictions, I find that the tax rate faced as an employee has a large
positive impact, while the tax rate faced as a self-employed has a small negative impact
on the self-employment decision. Both the type of data, my estimation strategy and
my findings are different from those in Bruce (2000) and Parker (2003). While both of
these papers use individual earnings and tax rates in the employed and self-employed
status in a single country, I use employed and self-employed earnings and tax rates at
the industry–occupation level, and I use not only within, but between country varia-
tion in the analysis. In terms of methodology, Bruce (2000) controls for the difference
in the employed and self-employed tax rate, constraining the coefficients to be of the
same magnitude, but of different sign. He therefore implicitly assumes that the self-
employed fully comply in tax payments. He finds that higher marginal tax rates in
employment reduce the probability of going into self-employment, whereas higher
average tax rates mildly increase the probability. This latter result has similarities with
what I find, but as he constrains the tax rates to have an effect of the same magnitude
he cannot find the asymmetric result, which is a key finding in my paper. Parker (2003)
controls for the gains in terms of net income, and assumes that the self-employed re-
port their earnings truthfully, but do not pay a fraction of taxes due. This is at odds
with the evidence, which suggests that the self-employed evade income taxes by re-
porting a lower income both in surveys and to the tax authority (Hurst et al. (2014)).
This assumption together with not controlling for occupations and industries might
be the reason that – as opposed to my results – he does not find any evidence of a tax
evasion motive in the self-employment choice.
My findings imply that the extensive margin of adjustment should be taken into
account when considering the effects of tax rates on labor income, on taxable income
and on welfare. Since Feldstein (1999) showed that taxable income is a sufficient statis-
tic to evaluate the welfare gains from reducing taxes, several papers have revisited
this question. In particular Chetty (2009) and Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez, and
Peter (2009) point out that in the presence of tax evasion or sheltering, when these ac-
tivities entail not only resource, but transfer costs as well, taxable income might not be
a sufficient statistic for assessing the impact of tax changes on welfare. They show that
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the welfare costs in such a case depend on the elasticity of both labor income and tax-
able income. My results suggest that these models should be enriched with a choice on
the extensive margin between employment and self-employment in order to calculate
the welfare costs of taxation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the data and the
descriptive analysis, section 3 describes the construction of the tax functions, section 4
shows the results on tax rates and self-employment, and section 5 concludes.
2 Self-employment, occupations and industries
The employment data comes from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database,
which is a harmonized collection of microdatasets for upper- and middle-income coun-
tries. Depending on the country, the Luxembourg Income Study Database contains
data from either a tax register or a household survey. The LIS dataset has been col-
lected in waves, the initial, Wave 1 contains data from around 1980, while the most
recent Wave 9 contains data from around 2013. This paper uses data from Wave 5 and
Wave 6, from the years 1999-2002 and 2003-2005. The benefit of using this data is that
it contains detailed information on income for both employed and self-employed in-
dividuals. Table 1 shows the self-employment rate in the whole working population
and among the non-agricultural workers for several countries as calculated from the
LIS data. I restrict the sample to 18-65 year old working individuals, and all persons
whose status in employment is self-employed, employer, own-account worker, or con-
tributing family worker are counted as self-employed in the empirical specification,
while all others are considered employees. This Table shows that self-employment
rates vary substantially across countries;7 the rates vary from 6.6% in Denmark to
33.9% in Greece for the entire working population, and between 5.4% in Denmark and
26.3% in Greece among the non-agricultural workers.
A new finding of this paper, demonstrated in the top panel of Figure 1 is that
there is a large and systematic variation in self-employment rates across occupation
7Acs et al. (1994), Blanchflower (2000), Parker and Robson (2004) (among others) establish the large
dispersion and document the patterns of self-employment both over time within and across countries.
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Table 1: Self-employment rates across countries
Share of self-employed Share of self-employed
all non-agriculture all non-agriculture
Australia 0.129 0.115 Israel 0.111 0.107
Austria 0.119 0.091 Italy 0.267 0.261
Canada 0.158 - Luxembourg 0.071 0.052
Czech Rep. 0.160 0.159 Netherlands 0.116 0.129
Denmark 0.066 0.054 Norway 0.070 -
Estonia 0.072 0.056 Poland 0.268 0.117
Finland 0.144 0.111 Slovenia 0.122 0.090
France 0.095 0.070 Spain 0.160 0.149
Germany 0.097 0.094 Sweden 0.098 -
Greece 0.339 0.263 Switzerland 0.108 -
Hungary 0.112 0.103 UK 0.107 0.104
Ireland 0.157 0.139 US 0.108 0.103
Author’s own calculations from Wave 6 of the Luxembourg Income Study Database (LIS). Share of self-
employed, employer, own-account worker and contributing family worker, in the working age (18-65)
total employed population in the first column, and among the non-agricultural workers in the second
column.
groups.8 The bottom panel of Figure 1 confirms the findings of Torrini (2005) that
the self-employment rates across industries differ significantly as well.9 The cross
country average of occupation or industry self-employment rates are shown with the
black squares, the other symbols show the self-employment rate for each occupation
and each industry in various countries.10 This figure demonstrates that there is a sys-
tematic difference in the propensity of self-employment both across occupations and
across industries which is common to countries. Perhaps not surprisingly the highest
self-employment rate tends to be in the skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery occupa-
tions and in the agriculture, forestry and fishing industry. The lowest self-employment
8The occupation of the worker is one of the 10-category International Standard Classification of
Occupations (ISCO) recode: (1) managers, (2) professionals, (3) technicians and associate professionals,
(4) clerical support workers, (5) service and sales workers, (6) skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery
workers, (7) craft and related trades workers, (8) plant and machine operators, and assemblers, (9)
elementary occupations, (10) armed forces.
9The industry of a worker is one from the following 9-category industry classification: (1) agri-
culture, forestry and fishing, (2) mining and quarrying, manufacturing, utilities, (3) construction, (4)
wholesale and retail trade, repair, hotels and restaurants, (5) transport, storage and communication, (6)
financial intermediation, (7) real estate, renting and business activities, (8) public administration, edu-
cation, health and social work, (9) community, social and personal services; activities of households.
10See Table 6 and Table 5 in the appendix for the cross-country average self-employment rates and
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Figure 1: Self-employment rates
Author’s own calculations from Wave 6 of LIS. This figure shows the self-employment rates in each
occupation in the top panel, and in each industry in the bottom panel for various countries. The indus-
tries and occupations are ordered based on their cross-country average self-employment rate (shown
with black squares).
rate tends to be in the occupation of clerical support workers and in the industry of public
administration, education, health and social work. This suggests that perhaps some of the
cross-country differences in overall self-employment rates are due to differences in the
structure of employment either across occupations or across industries. However, as
shown in the appendix this is not the case. This can be understood by observing in
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Figure 1 that the actual occupation/industry self-employment rates in specific coun-
tries vary quite a bit around the cross-country averages, and this variation also seems
to be systematic. For example in Figure 1a we see that Luxembourg, which has a very
low overall self-employment rate at 7.1%, tends to have a low self-employment rate
in all occupations, except in the occupation of skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery
workers. The other panel 1b shows that Italy, which has one of the highest overall
self-employment rates in Wave 6 of the LIS data at 26.7%, has one of the highest self-
employment rates in every industry except agriculture, forestry and fishing, well above
each industry’s cross-country average. These findings suggest on the one hand that
a crucial determinant in the decision to become self-employed is the occupation and
industry of the individual. On the other hand there are large cross-country differences
in self-employment rates within industries and occupations.
In the next sections I investigate whether a country’s tax schedule plays a role in
the share of self-employed in specific industry–occupation cells. For the empirical
analysis I retain those countries where occupation and industry codes are available
in both Wave 5 and 6 in the LIS data. These countries are the Czech Republic, Fin-
land, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, the United Kingdom and the
United States of America. Table 2 shows summary statistics for both waves and all
countries considered. This table shows that there is a difference in the distribution
of employed and self-employed individuals across occupations and across industries.
Among the self-employed there tend to be more managers and agricultural workers
and less clerical support workers than among the employees. In terms of industries
the self-employed are more likely to work in agriculture, construction, real estate, rent-
ing and business activities, and are less likely to work in mining and quarrying and
public administration than employees. This table also confirms previous findings that
the self-employed are a little bit older, a little bit less educated, less likely to be females,
are slightly more likely to be married, and tend to have slightly more children.11
11See for example Blau (1987), Schuetze (2000), Wen and Gordon (2014) among others.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for employed and self-employed
Employed Self-employed
Mean SD Mean SD
Age 41.54 10.46 45.16 9.83
Education 2.23 0.79 2.17 0.83
Married 0.71 0.46 0.79 0.41
Female 0.50 0.50 0.34 0.47
Number of children 1.17 1.16 1.29 1.27
Occupations
Managers 0.13 0.33 0.24 0.43
Professionals 0.18 0.38 0.13 0.33
Technicians & associate professionals 0.15 0.35 0.12 0.32
Clerical support workers 0.13 0.34 0.03 0.18
Service & sales workers 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.31
Skilled agricultural, forestry & fishery workers 0.01 0.12 0.13 0.34
Craft & related trades workers 0.12 0.32 0.15 0.35
Plant & machine operators & assemblers 0.09 0.28 0.05 0.22
Elementary occupations 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.21
Industries
Agricultural, forestry & fishing 0.01 0.11 0.15 0.36
Mining & quarrying, manufacturing, utilities 0.20 0.40 0.08 0.27
Construction 0.06 0.24 0.15 0.36
Wholesale & retails trade, repair, hotels & restaurants 0.16 0.36 0.19 0.39
Transport, storage & communications 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.23
Financial intermediation 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.16
Real estate, renting & business activities 0.10 0.30 0.17 0.38
Public admin., education, health & social work 0.30 0.46 0.09 0.29
Community, social & pers. serv., activities of the hhs 0.05 0.23 0.08 0.27
Number of observations 246,609 39,475
Author’s own calculations from Wave 5 and 6 of LIS for the countries where both occupation and
industry variables are available in both waves. The values for occupations and industries show the
fraction of employed and self-employed working in each category.
3 Building the tax functions
The main hypothesis this paper aims to test is that people respond to higher tax rates
by adjusting their employment status from employment to self-employment in order
to be able to underreport their income and hence evade some of their tax payments. In
order to test this, I rely on both cross-country and within-country variation in statutory
tax rates. However, accurate information on the tax rates on wages and on income
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from self-employment at different income levels for several countries is not readily
available.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) publishes
Taxing Wages annually.12 This publication provides information for all OECD coun-
tries on the precise rules governing the income tax schedule, as well as the social secu-
rity contributions paid by the employees, by the employers, and by the self-employed,
as well as all family benefits paid as cash transfers or as tax credits.13
Using the information contained in the Taxing Wages publications I carefully code
the standard tax schedules, and I also take into account all the tax credits and tax
reliefs, the different rates and limits of all social security contributions made by the
employee and the self-employed, as well as any cash transfers.14 This allows me to
calculate a separate income tax and social security contribution function for the em-
ployees and the self-employed.15 Based on these functions the average income tax
rate, excluding or including the social security contributions at any gross income level
and in both employment statuses can be calculated.16 To my knowledge, this is the
first paper that creates these functions and uses tax rates corresponding to the actual
income at the industry–occupation level in a cross-country setting.
Figure 2 shows the average tax rates excluding (solid line) and including (dashed
line) social security contributions as a function of annual gross labor income for em-
ployees in the top row and for self-employed in the bottom row for three selected coun-
12Before 1996 it was called The Tax/Benefit Position of Production Workers, between 1996-1998 it
was called The Tax/Benefit Position of Employees. From 1998 it is published as Taxing Wages. In
creating the tax functions I use the following releases: 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005.
13As an example of the employee social security contributions: in Ireland in 2004 each employee
was exempt from paying health insurance contributions if their weekly earnings did not exceed 356
EUR, but they needed to pay the 2% contribution rate on all of their earnings if their weekly earnings
exceeded 356 EUR. For social insurance, employees were exempt if they earned less than 287 EUR,
above this limit, but below 42160 EUR a year they had to pay 4% with a weekly exemption of 127 EUR
of earnings, and above 42160 EUR per year they had to pay 4% of 42160 EUR.
14I calculate the income tax and social security functions for a single individual without children. I
also ignore any within country differences stemming from local taxes.
15The income tax schedules (i. e. the rates and bands) are the same in all of these countries for the em-
ployed and the self-employed. The only reason for any difference in the income tax functions between
employees and self-employed is that allowances might differ due to the difference in social security
contributions.
16While the marginal income tax rates can also be calculated, it is the average tax rate that matters for
net income differences and the self-employment decision, therefore I do not use them in the regression
analysis.
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Figure 2: Average tax rates as a function of annual gross labor income
This figure plots average tax rates excluding (solid) and including (dashed) social security contributions
for employees in the top row and for self-employed in the bottom row as a function of annual income
in Spain, Finland, and the USA in 2004, authors own calculations based on OECD Taxing Wages (2004
and 2005 editions). The vertical lines show the average earnings of workers in the same year and
employment status in four industry–occupation pairs, see text for details.
tries in 2004. It is worth to note that for Finland and the USA the average income tax
rate function excluding social security contributions (solid blue lines) is the same for
employees and self-employed. For Spain there is a slight difference, as the income tax
allowances are based on the social security payments and these differ across employ-
ment statuses. The tax rate functions including the social security contributions are
substantially different even at the same income level between the employed and the
self-employed. The vertical lines in Figure 2 show the average earnings of employed
and respectively self-employed workers in the country calculated from Wave 6 of the
LIS for four industry–occupation pairs. The average earnings of the employed and of
the self-employed in a given industry–occupation cell are calculated from the personal
labor income variable from the LIS, which records the gross yearly earnings of the indi-
vidual, before personal income tax and social security contribution deductions.17 The
17It is important to keep in mind the limited reliability of the income data of the self-employed.
For some countries the LIS microdata comes directly from the tax registers. For these countries, if the
self-employed indeed tend to underreport their income, then the income data for the self-employed is
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industry–occupation pairs marked in Figure 2 are managers in real estate, renting and
business activities (dashed red), managers in wholesale and retail trade, repair, hotels
and restaurants (dashed-dotted yellow), craft and related trades workers in real estate,
renting and business activities (solid green), craft and related trades workers in whole-
sale and retail trade, repair, hotels and restaurants (dotted grey). Therefore tax rates
faced by an employee and a self-employed in a given industry–occupation–country
cell are different because the incomes and potentially the tax functions are different in
the two statuses.
This figure shows the types of variation I use in the empirical analysis. First,
within countries there is a large difference in the earnings and the average tax rate
across industry–occupation cells, which are not the same across countries. Second,
even within country and within occupations (comparing dashed red to dotted-dashed
yellow and solid green to dotted grey) or within industries (dashed red to solid green
and dashed-dotted yellow to dotted grey) there is quite a bit of variation in income
and the corresponding tax rates. Finally, across countries there is variation in the tax
rate differentials (between employees and self-employed) within industry–occupation
cells.18
The substantial variation in average tax rates within countries19 suggests that when
assessing the effect of average tax rates on the choice of status in employment, control-
ling for only the average realized value of the average tax rate in the economy as a
whole might not be sufficient.
4 Tax rates and self-employment
In what follows I first sketch a model to demonstrate that the decision to become
self-employed depends in an asymmetric way on the income tax rate faced by the
not the true one. Moreover, household surveys are similar to tax registers in this sense, i. e. the self-
employed also tend to underreport their income in household surveys, as demonstrated for example
in Hurst et al. (2014). In Figure 2 the average self-employed income is significantly lower in Spain
and Finland than the average employed income for each industry–occupation pair, this could suggest
underreporting.
18In section 4 I use only the average tax rates including social security contributions. The results are
similar for average tax rates excluding social security contributions and are available on request.
19See Table 7 in the appendix for summary statistics by country.
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employed and by the self-employed if the self-employed evade some of their income
taxes. Then using the LIS data combined with the tax schedules I test and find support-
ive evidence for the predictions of the model at the industry–occupation–country–year
level.
Denote the exogenous expected income of individual j in employment by yEj , and
in self-employment by ySj . Further let tE(y) denote the average tax rate that an em-
ployee faces at income level y, and tS(y) denote the average tax rate that a self-employed
faces at income level y. In line with the existing literature and the empirical evidence I
assume that while employees report their entire income truthfully, self-employed un-
derreport their income.20 I further assume that the self-employed report κ ≤ 1 fraction
of their income, such that y˜Sj the reported income can be expressed as y˜Sj = κySj . For
simplicity I assume that the fraction κ is exogenously given, and that people never get
caught.21 Under these assumptions the log utility from income for the employed and
the self-employed can be written as:
UE = log(y
E
j (1− tE(yEj ))) = log yEj + log(1− tE(yEj ))
US = log(y
S
j − κySj tS(κySj )) = log(ySj (1− κtS(y˜Sj ))) = log ySj + log(1− κtS(y˜Sj )).
It is important to note that the utility difference between the two statuses depend on
the average tax rate, rather than on the marginal tax rate that the individual faces.22












20See for example Andreoni et al. (1998), Bloomquist (2003), Slemrod (2007), and Kleven et al. (2011).
The papers estimating the extent of income underreporting by the self-employed also build on the
assumption that the employees truthfully report, while the self-employed underreport their income.
21In the appendix I relax these assumptions and show that the predictions of the model are very
similar.
22The marginal tax rates are probably more important for the amount of income under-reported. I
discuss the case of endogenous κ in the appendix, and as I show there, due to the optimality of the
amount of under-reporting, only the direct effect of taxes matter for the utility difference, and hence it
is enough to consider the effect of the average tax rate even in that case.
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There are two things to note in the above expressions. First, the effect of the self-
employed tax rate on the utility difference is increasing in magnitude in κ. This can be
seen in the expression above, as in absolute terms the numerator is an increasing func-
tion, while the denominator is a decreasing function of κ. Put differently, the more the
self-employed under-report their income, the smaller κ is, and the less important is the
self-employed tax rate in the self-employment decision. Second, a lower κ also implies
a larger asymmetry between the employed and the self-employed tax rate, if only the
self-employed are able to evade taxes. Given that the empirical evidence suggests that
κ << 1, one would expect the tax rates in employment and self-employment to have
opposite effects, and a smaller absolute magnitude for the tax rate in self-employment.
In what follows, I test the predictions of this simple model at the level of industry–
occupation–country–year cells, based on the evidence in section 2, which shows that
there are significant differences in the propensity of self-employment across occupa-
tions and across industries, as well as significant cross-country differences. Taking as
given an individual’s occupation, industry and country, I ask how the tax rate on the
expected (reported) income from employment and from self-employment affect the
decision to become self-employed. Besides the expected differences in the utility from
disposable income other factors can impact the decision to work as self-employed.
This decision likely depends on non-pecuniary factors such as age, education, gender,
marital status, number of children, and based on the evidence in the section 2 also on
industry, occupation and country of work (all captured in Zj), and an idiosyncratic
utility from working as a self-employed (νj ∼ F (·) iid with mean zero). Using the
formulation allowing for tax evasion by the self-employed, the selection equation can
be written as:
I∗j = 1 if γ1(log y
S
j + log(1− κtS(y˜Sj ))− log yEj − log(1− tE(yEj ))) + γ2Zj + νj ≥ 0, (1)
where I∗j = 1 if the individual works as a self-employed, and is zero otherwise. There
are two difficulties in estimating the above equation. The first problem, especially for
the self-employed, is that I observe the reported income (y˜Sj ), and not the true income
(ySj ). I do not correct for income underreporting, instead in the empirical specification
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I allow the coefficients on income and on tax rates to be different between the em-
ployed and the self-employed.23 It is important to note from (1) that using the tax rate
differential between the two employment statuses, tE(yEj )− tS(y˜Sj ), as an independent
variable in case κ < 1 is not correct and would lead to biased estimates.24 The second
issue is that I observe the income for each individual in the employment status that
he is currently in, but not in the alternative employment status. In this paper I use
the average realized reported earnings of the employed (yE) and of the self-employed
(y˜S) within the industry–occupation–country–year cell as an approximation for the ex-
pected (reported) earnings.25 Given the calculated average reported earnings in each
employment status, I can calculate the average tax rate at the relevant income level for
the employed tE(yE) and the self-employed tS(y˜S) using the tax functions specific to
the country-year and employment status described in section 3.
The fraction of self-employed in a given cell can be approximated as:
ηSE = 1− F
(−γ1[log y˜S + log κ− log(1− κtS(y˜S)) + log yE + log(1− tE(yE))]− γ2Z) ,
(2)
where Z contains the average of the personal characteristics of individuals in the cell,
and cell characteristics, and F (·) is the cumulative distribution function of the id-
iosyncratic utility of working as a self-employed. Denoting its probability density
function by f(·), it can be seen that the fraction of self-employed in a given cell is in-
creasing in tE(yE) at rate γ1f(·)/(1 − tE(yE)), while it is decreasing in tS(y˜S) at rate
γ1κf(·)/(1− κtS(y˜S)).
23The papers estimating the degree of income underreporting by the self-employed all use informa-
tion on a different measure (consumption for example in Pissarides and Weber (1989) or bank loans as
in Artavanis et al. (2016)), which is assumed to 1) be correctly reported for the self-employed as well,
and 2) have a similar relation to actual income for the employed and the self-employed. This type of
information is not available in the LIS data.
24Even if one used the approximation that log(1 − t) ≈ −t implying that log(1 − κtS(y˜Sj )) − log(1 −
tE(yEj )) ≈ tE(yE)− κtS(y˜Sj ), thus tE(yEj )− tS(y˜Sj ) is not a good approximation for κ << 1.
25This procedure does not address the issue of selection bias in earnings. In this context, since selec-
tion depends on net income, which is a non-linear function of gross income, a selection bias correction
as in Heckman (1979) is not possible. Parker (2003) linearizes the average tax rates on a set of income
bands, and assumes that the error correction does not modify the tax rate. Wen and Gordon (2014) run
a reduced form probit ignoring taxes to extract the correction terms.
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To test for this relation I run several versions of the following regression:26








ciot) + β3 log y
E
ciot + β4 log y˜
S
ciot + β5Xciot + β6FE + εciot.
Table 3 summarizes the baseline results. The dependent variable in each column is the
natural logarithm of the fraction of self-employed in the country-industry–occupation–
year cell, and the main explanatory variables are the log of the average reported la-
bor income for the employees (log yEciot) and for the self-employed (log y˜Sciot), and the
country-year and employment status specific average tax rates that these income lev-
els are subject to (tEct(yEciot) and tSct(y˜Sciot) respectively). The fourth and the sixth columns
also include the square of the log of the average earnings. All columns control for
demographic characteristics of the cell in Xciot (average age, education, fraction of
women, fraction of married, number of children), as well as country fixed effects. The
columns differ in whether and how they control for occupations and industries. The
first column does not control for neither industries nor occupations, the second col-
umn only includes industry fixed effects. The third and the fourth columns include
both occupation and industry fixed effects, while the fifth and the sixth columns in-
clude occupation and industry fixed effects and their interaction.
Comparing the first three columns shows the importance of including industry and
to a lesser extent occupation fixed effects. Excluding both industry and occupation
fixed effects the explanatory power of the model is very low, and neither tax rates
have an effect significantly different from zero. The sign of the income effect is as
expected, the magnitude is similar across specifications, and the magnitude is similar
between the log of the employee and the reported self-employed income (as predicted
by the simple model). Including industry fixed effects increases the R2 of the model
significantly, and the effect of the average employee tax rate takes the expected sign,
and becomes highly significant, while the effect of the self-employed tax rate is not
significant, but takes the expected sign.
26This formulation relies on the approximation log(1 − tE(yEj )) ≈ −tE(yEj ) and log(1 − κtS(y˜Sj )) ≈
−κtS(y˜Sj ). An alternative is to use directly log(1− tE(yE)) in the regression and while log(1− κtS(y˜S))
can not be used as κ is unknown, log(1 − tS(y˜S)) can be used as an approximation. I show the results
of this alternative regression in Table 8 in the appendix.
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Table 3: Cell level regression results
DV: log share SE 1 2 3 4 5 6
tE(yE) -0.60 6.89 ∗∗∗ 4.46 ∗∗∗ 4.59 ∗∗ 4.94 ∗∗∗ 4.65 ∗∗∗
( 3.62 ) ( 1.77 ) ( 2.06 ) ( 1.68 ) ( 1.37 ) ( 1.45 )
tS(y˜S) -0.56 -1.06 -0.76 -0.68 -0.42 -0.42
( 0.98 ) ( 0.81 ) ( 0.69 ) ( 0.60 ) ( 0.74 ) ( 0.70 )
log yE -0.23 -0.26 ∗ -0.26 ∗∗ -0.06 -0.12 0.04
( 0.15 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.90 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.79 )
(log yE)2 -0.01 0.00
( 0.04 ) ( 0.03 )
log y˜S 0.31 ∗∗ 0.30 ∗∗ 0.24 ∗∗ 0.56 0.09 0.42
( 0.15 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.50 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.45 )
(log y˜S)2 -0.02 -0.02
( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 )
Controls X X X X X X
country FE X X X X X X
industry FE X X X X X
occupation FE X X X X
occ x ind FE X X
R-squared 0.20 0.54 0.62 0.63 0.75 0.75
Observations 976 976 976 976 976 976
OLS regressions, with robust standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable: natural logarithm of
the share of self-employed in the given industry–occupation–country–year cell among working age,
employed population, authors own calculations from LIS Wave 5 and Wave 6. Independent variables:
average tax rate at the average earnings of employed/self-employed and log average income (and its
square) of employed/self-employed within a cell. Controls: cell average of age, education, marital
status, gender, number of children. Countries: Czech Republic, Germany, Finland, Hungary, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Spain, UK, US. Occupations: 9 ISCO categories, industries: 9 categories see section 2.
Average tax rates for each income level and employment status: authors own calculations based on
country tax codes from OECD. Significance: ∗∗∗ at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10%.
Columns (3) to (6) show the main results of this table: out of the main regressors,
only the coefficient on the tax rate faced as an employee is significantly different from
zero across all specifications, has a value of around 4.5-5, which is robust across differ-
ent specifications which control for both occupation and industry. This implies that a
one percentage point increase in the employee tax rate leads to a 4.5 percent increase in
the self-employment rate. The point estimate of the effect of the average self-employed
tax rate is smaller in magnitude and negative, although not statistically significant.27
27Using the alternative specification of log(1 − tE(yE)) and log(1 − tS(y˜S)) rather than the tax rates
directly the point estimate of the effect of the self-employed log net of tax is significant, with about a
4-fold difference in the magnitude with the employee log net of tax. These results are shown in Table 8
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In column (3) both the log income of employees and self-employed are of the expected
sign and similar magnitude, as predicted by the simple model. This is true even when
including industry–occupation fixed effects, though both income variables lose sig-
nificance. When including the quadratic log income terms, all income variables lose
significance.
These results confirm the main hypothesis of the model which allows for tax eva-
sion by the self-employed. The tax rate faced as an employee has a significant pos-
itive correlation with the probability of self-employment, while the tax rate faced
as a self-employed has a much smaller negative point estimate. This suggests two
things: first that a larger tax rate faced as an employee pushes individuals towards
self-employment, and second – since the point estimate on tS is smaller – that this is
partly due to the benefits of income tax evasion, because individuals expect to under-
report their earnings when they are self-employed.
Table 4: Individual level regression results
DV: dummy SE 1 2 3 4
tE(yE) 0.28 0.80 ∗∗∗ 0.68 ∗∗∗ 0.75 ∗∗∗
( 0.18 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.17 ) ( 0.12 )
tS(y˜S) 0.01 -0.14 -0.11 ∗ -0.10 ∗∗
( 0.10 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.05 )
log yE 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
( 0.02 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 )
log y˜S 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
( 0.02 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.01 )
Controls X X X X
country FE X X X X
industry FE X X X
occupation FE X X
occ x ind FE X
Observations 277024 277024 277024 277024
Marginal effects from probit regressions, with robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the
industry–occupation–country–year cell level. Independent variables: average tax rate at the average
earnings of employed/self-employed and log average income of employed/self-employed within the
industry–occupation–country–year cell. Controls: age (and its square), education (and its square), mar-
ital status, gender, number of children. Data, countries, occupation and industry categories as in Table
3. Significance: ∗∗∗ at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ at 10%.
in the appendix.
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In Table 4 I show a different set of regressions. The dependent variable is a self-
employment indicator, which takes the value 1 if the individual is self-employed, and
0 otherwise. The main independent variables are the same as in Table 3: the average
tax rate at the average earning of the employed and self-employed, and the log of
the average income of the employed and self-employed in the cell. I control for the
individual’s age (and its square), education (and its square), marital status, gender
and number of children, rather than their cell average. I also use the same set of fixed
effects as in Table 3.
The results from this table confirm the cell level regression results. The first columns
again demonstrate the importance of including industry fixed effects and to a lesser
extent occupation fixed effects. When neither is included, none of the explanatory
variables are significant, while when including at least industry fixed effect the co-
efficient on the employee tax rate becomes significant. Once at least industry fixed
effects are included, the marginal effect of the tax rate faced by the average employee
is around 0.7, it is highly statistically significant, and its value is robust across spec-
ifications. This implies that a 1 percentage point higher employee tax rate implies
a 0.7 percentage point increase in the probability of becoming self-employed condi-
tional on the distribution of the independent variables in the sample. The marginal
effect of the self-employed tax rate is negative and has a smaller absolute value (it
is around -0.1) and is statistically significant when controlling for both industry and
occupation. None of the income variables have a significant marginal effect, and the
point estimates are quite small. This suggests that the other controls, namely age, ed-
ucation, gender, the occupation and the industry of the worker are better predictors of
their respective employee and self-employed income than the cell averages. It seems
nonetheless, that the average tax rate captures the tax incentives well.
The main result from these regressions is that the magnitude of the marginal effect
of the two tax rates is very different: the employee tax rate has a large positive, while
the self-employed tax rate has a much smaller negative effect, which is not statistically
significant. These results – given the simple model of the self-employment decision
– jointly suggest that individuals are more likely to become self-employed if taxes on
employees are higher, and this is partly driven by the possibility of tax evasion when
20
self-employed.
These regressions show that there is a strong positive correlation between the tax
rate faced as an average employee and the self-employment rate (or the self-employment
indicator) in a given industry–occupation–country cell. Since the tax scheme is not
exogenous, this cannot be treated as a causal relation. In particular there are two is-
sues: reversed causality and omitted variables. It seems unlikely that there is reversed
causality. Reversed causality would imply that a high incidence of self-employment
in a given industry–occupation cell (relative to the cross-country average in the given
industry–occupation, and relative to the country average) leads the government to
increase taxes for the (relatively few) employed workers in this cell, but not for the
self-employed. While in some low income countries the policy of a high tax rate on
the narrow tax base of salaried individuals might be used, it is difficult to interpret
the findings of this paper in such a way. First, without controlling for industry and
occupation fixed effects I do not find evidence of higher taxes being associated with
higher self-employment rates. Second, such a policy is also hard to implement, as the
tax rates depend on the income, and not on the industry and occupation of the in-
dividual.28 Another possibility is that there is an omitted variable that leads to high
self-employment and high taxes on the employees (but not on the self-employed).
While it is not possible to exclude this possibility the fact that I control for country and
industry–occupation fixed effects greatly limits its scope.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I analyze the relation between the share of self-employed and the tax
rates on salaried and on self-employment income. Using a simple model I show that
if evasion is possible only for the self-employed, then the self-employment decision is
less responsive to the tax rate on self-employed income than to the tax rate on income
from employment. I test this prediction using cross country household level data from
the Luxembourg Income Studies. In the empirical specification – driven by patterns I
28While in some countries there might be industry or occupation specific tax breaks, I did not code
these, and therefore the tax rates used in the analysis only depend on the income and employment
status of the individual.
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document in the data – I use variation in tax rates both within and across countries,
occupations, and industries. I argue that controlling for occupations and industries is
important because there are systematic differences in self-employment rates not only
across industries, but across occupations, which are common across countries. The
regressions robustly confirm the predictions of the model. When taxes on income from
dependent employment are high, more people choose self-employment, but people do
not respond symmetrically to high taxes on self-employed income. This is suggestive
evidence that there is adjustment on the extensive margin of tax evasion to tax rates,
by people choosing their status in employment.
This implies that when analyzing the welfare costs of taxation, the extensive mar-
gin of adjustment should be taken into account. The literature thus far has neglected
the analysis of this margin, and instead has focused on the role of the type of costs tax
evasion entails. It has been shown that if tax evasion has a transfer cost as well as a re-
source cost, then the welfare costs are a weighted average of the elasticity of both labor
income and taxable income, and empirically these two elasticities are quite different.
My results suggest that these models should be further enriched with a choice on the
extensive margin between employment and self-employment in order to calculate the
welfare costs of taxation.
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Table 5 and 6 complement Figure 1 from the main text. These two tables show the aver-
age cross-country patterns of self-employment rates and employment shares of differ-
ent occupations and of different industries. Even though the general cross-occupation
(cross-industry) patterns are similar across countries, there are significant differences
across countries as can be seen from the standard deviations.
Table 5: Self-employment rates and employment shares across occupations
SE rate Employment share
Managers 0.37(0.20) 0.09(0.04)
Professionals 0.12(0.05) 0.14(0.03)
Technicians and associate professionals 0.08(0.04) 0.15(0.05)
Clerical support workers 0.02(0.02) 0.11(0.04)
Service and sales workers 0.12(0.08) 0.13 (0.02)
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 0.62(0.28) 0.05(0.05)
Craft and related trades workers 0.14(0.10) 0.14(0.04)
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers 0.08(0.06) 0.09(0.04)
Elementary occupations 0.05(0.03) 0.09(0.03)
Average self-employment rates and employment shares (and their standard deviation in brackets)
in different occupations calculated for Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, UK, US. Author’s own calculations
from Wave 6 of LIS. Definition of self-employed as in the main text.
Table 6: Self-employment rates and employment shares across industries
SE rate Emp share
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.49(0.23) 0.04(0.03)
Mining and quarrying; manufacturing; utilities 0.07(0.05) 0.20(0.07)
Construction 0.23(0.11) 0.08(0.02)
Wholesale and retail trade, repair; hotels and restaurants 0.18(0.12) 0.18(0.03)
Transport, storage and communication 0.12(0.06) 0.06(0.01)
Financial intermediation 0.09(0.07) 0.04(0.02)
Real estate, renting and business activities 0.22(0.11) 0.09(0.03)
Public admin; education; health and social work 0.04(0.01) 0.25(0.05)
Community, social/personal serv; activities of households 0.18(0.07) 0.07(0.02)
Average self-employment rates and employment shares (and their standard deviation in brackets)
in different industries calculated for Australia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK, US. Author’s own
calculations from Wave 6 of LIS. Definition of self-employed as in the main text.
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Below I compare two counterfactual self-employment rates to gauge the impor-
tance of the structure of employment and of the industry/occupation self-employment
rates for the variation in overall self-employment rates across countries. In each coun-





where the aggregation j can be over industries or occupations, η is the overall self-
employment rate, λj is the employment share in industry (or occupation) j, and ηj
is the self-employment rate in industry (or occupation) j. Given this formulation,










In the above formulation η̂SE captures the importance of cross-country differences in
industry or occupation self-employment rates: it uses the country’s self-employment
rate in each category, while using the cross-country average of each category’s employ-
ment share. Conversely η̂emp captures the importance of cross-country differences in
the structure of employment: it uses the country’s employment share structure across
categories, but uses the cross-country average of the self-employment rate in each cat-
egory.
Figure 3 shows the counterfactual self-employment rates based on industries in the
left panels, and based on occupations in the right panels. The top row is based on all
working individuals, whereas the bottom row is based on those outside of agricul-
tural industries (in the left), and occupations (in the right panel).The dots correspond
to countries, showing on the horizontal axis the actual self-employment rates (η), and
on the vertical axis the counterfactual one. The blue squares show the counterfactual






















































































(d) Occupation cfs non-agriculture
Figure 3: Counterfactual self-employment rates
Author’s own calculations from Wave 5 and 6 of LIS. In this figure each dot corresponds to a country,
showing the counterfactual self-employment rates on the vertical axis, against its actual value on the
horizontal axis, as well as linear fits. In all panels the red circles correspond to η̂emp from (4), and the
blue squares correspond to η̂SE from (3). The top row is based on all working individuals, the bottom
row is based on those working in non-agricultural sectors or occupations. The left panels show these
based on the industry aggregation, while the right based on occupations. The average employment
share (λj) and self-employment rate (ηj) in each category is calculated by wave.
industry or occupation (η̂SE), whereas the red circles show the counterfactual self-
employment rates based on the country’s actual employment structure (η̂emp). In these
graphs, the closer is the fitted line to the 45 degree line, the better that predictor is
for the actual self-employment rate. In general these graphs show that while both the
actual structure of employment and the actual self-employment rates in different cate-
gories are decent predictors of a country’s actual self-employment rate, the latter pro-
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vides much better predictions. Moreover, looking at the self-employment rate among
non-agricultural workers, the fit using the actual employment structure (η̂emp) dete-
riorates, while the fit using the actual self-employment rates across categories (η̂SE)
improves.29 This implies that the predictive power of the structure of employment for
the cross-country differences in self-employment rates mainly comes from the size of
the country’s agricultural sector and agricultural occupations. These observations im-
ply that to understand cross-country differences in self-employment rates, one has to
understand what drives cross-country differences within occupations and industries
in self-employment rates.
A.2 Summary statistics of average tax rates
Table 7 reports the average, the minimum and the maximum of the average tax rate
faced by an employee in a given country across the two years used in the analysis
(corresponding to Wave 5 and 6 of the LIS) and across all industry–occupation cells.
Table 7: Average and marginal tax rate variations within countries
average tax rate
average minimum maximum
Czech Republic 0.23 0.13 0.32
Finland 0.32 0.15 0.46
Germany 0.36 0.21 0.52
Hungary 0.31 0.14 0.46
Ireland 0.17 0.00 0.37
Luxembourg 0.26 0.13 042
Spain 0.21 0.06 0.39
UK 0.22 0.00 0.32
US 0.26 0.17 0.35
29Torrini (2005) calculates what is here called η̂SE for the industry aggregation for non-agricultural
workers for several European countries, and reaches a similar conclusion as I do in stating that the
employment structure across industries does not seem to be the major determinant of cross-country
differences in the self-employment rate.
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A.3 Self-employment decision
In the main body of the paper I assume that the fraction of income reported, κ, is
exogenously given. In general, however, κ is chosen to maximize the expected utility




(1− p(κ)) log(ySj − τS(κySj )) + p(κ) log(ySj − τS(ySj )− z(ySj , κ, tS))− g(κ).
In the above equation p(κ) is the probability of getting caught for underreporting κ
fraction of income, g(κ) is the utility cost of sheltering this fraction, and z(ySj , κ, tS) is
the penalty one has to pay when caught evading, which can depend on the level of
income, the fraction of income evaded, and the average tax rate schedule tS . Note that
this penalty is on top of paying the actual taxes due, τS(ySj ). However, if κ is indeed
chosen optimally, then ∂US/∂κ = 0. This implies that for the expected utility difference
from self-employment and employment, only the direct effect of taxes matter, the one
working through κ does not. Therefore, instead of using τS(κySj ) for the total post-
evasion tax payment, one can use κySj tS(κySj ), where tS(·) denotes the average tax rate
as a function of declared income. For the utility comparison one can work with the
following, simplified version, where κ∗ denotes optimal income reporting:
US = (1−p(κ∗)) log(ySj (1−κ∗tS(κ∗ySj )))+p(κ∗) log(ySj (1− tS(ySj ))−z(ySj , κ∗, tS))−g(κ∗).














(ySj (1− tS(ySj ))− z(ySj , κ∗, tS))
.
The first term in the above sum is very similar to the one derived in the main text, it
just has a multiplier 1−p(κ∗) < 1, and is thus smaller. The second term is also negative,
therefore increasing the magnitude of the effect of the tax rate on maximized utility.
It is important to note that this term is very close to zero, as p(κ∗), the probability of
getting caught at the optimal level of underreporting κ∗ is likely to be very small. This
implies that even if κ∗ is endogenous, and people can get caught and can be fined if
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they evade taxes, the impact of taxes on the maximized utility of the self-employed is
likely to be smaller than for the employees.
A.4 Alternative tax measure: log of net rate
Table 8 is the same as Table 3 in the main text, except instead of tEct(yEciot) and tSct(y˜Sciot), it
uses the natural logarithm of the net of tax rate, log(1− tEct(yEciot)) and log(1− tSct(y˜Sciot)).
As mentioned in the main text, the correct independent variables to be used would be
log(1 − tEct(yEciot)) and log(1 − κtSct(y˜Sciot)), but as κ in unknown, this is not possible and
an approximation needs to be used. In the main text I rely on the approximation that
log(1 − tEct(yEciot)) ≈ −tEct(yEciot) and log(1 − κtSct(y˜Sciot)) ≈ −κtSct(y˜Sciot). Here I show the
results for the logarithm of the net of tax rate. Based on the simple model, one would
expect the logarithm of the employee net of tax rate to have a negative, while the self-
employed net of tax rate to have a positive effect of smaller magnitude. This prediction
along with all other results from Table 3 in the main text is verified in Table 8, where
also the coefficient on the logarithm of the self-employed net of tax is significant.
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Table 8: Cell level regression results: log net of tax
DV: log share SE 1 2 3 4 5 6
log(1− tE(yE)) -0.32 -4.88 ∗∗∗ -3.36 ∗∗∗ -3.49 ∗∗ -3.74 ∗∗∗ -3.58 ∗∗∗
( 2.29 ) ( 1.18 ) ( 1.09 ) ( 1.41 ) ( 0.89 ) ( 1.00 )
log(1− tS(y˜S)) 0.89 ∗∗ 1.01 ∗∗ 0.98 ∗∗ 0.92 ∗∗ 0.61 0.55
( 0.47 ) ( 0.42 ) ( 0.38 ) ( 0.44 ) ( 0.43 ) ( 0.55 )
log yE -0.29 ∗∗ -0.28 ∗∗ -0.31 ∗∗ 0.13 -0.16 0.18
( 0.14 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.96 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.82 )
(log yE)2 -0.02 -0.01
( 0.04 ) ( 0.03 )
log y˜S 0.36 ∗∗∗ 0.32 ∗∗∗ 0.28 ∗∗ 0.30 0.12 0.26
( 0.13 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.63 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.58 )
(log y˜S)2 0.00 -0.01
0.03 0.03
Controls X X X X X X
country FE X X X X X X
industry FE X X X X X
occupation FE X X X X
occ x ind FE X X
R-squared 0.20 0.54 0.63 0.63 0.75 0.75
Observations 973 973 973 973 973 973
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